Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

State of Utah v. Patry Curtis : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert Van Sciver; Attorney for Appellant.
Vernon G. Romney; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Patry Curtis, No. 13879.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1057

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

;F

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

u.

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 13879

v.
PATRY CURTIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE BRYANT H. CROFT, JUDGE, PRESIDING

ROBERT VAN SCIVER
Athay, Bown and Van iSciver
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellant

VERNON G. ROMNEY
Attorney General ,
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

FILE
JUN 2 61975

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
P
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN Til 10 LOW Wit COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
STATEMENT < »K i-\\\ T S
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING
THE LINE OF QUESTIONING ON THE MOTIVKS.
CREDIBILITY, AND PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF
ROSE ANN STOUT IN HER CAPACITY OF AN UNDERCOVER AGENT
POl X T ' ; Til H TRIAL r o t RT ERRED IN NOT K
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE D E F E N J J ^ A I
WAS ENTRAPPED INTO COMMITTING THE OFFENSE CHARGED
POINT III. WiihN . i l h i l L IS EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT IS MERELY ACTING AS A GOBETWEEN IN PROCURING DRUGS FOR AN UNl>KIfCOVER AGENT AND NO EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANT WAS PERSONALLY RECEIVING
ANY GAIN FROM THE TRANSACTION, THE DEFENDANT CANNOT BE FOUND GUILTY OF DISTRIBUTING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR
VALUE
CONCLUSION

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—(Continued)
Page
CASES CITED
Adams v. U.S

10

Durham v. State

10

In Re 'Sadlier, 97 U. 291, 85 P.2d 810 (1938)

5

LeGrrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Ut. 2d 260,
420 P.2d 615 (1966)

5

People v. Forbes

11

Posey v. State

10

Eoy v. State

10

Sherman v. U.S., 356 U.S. 369 (1958)
Smith v. State
Sorrels v. U.'S., 287 U.S. 435 (1932)

7
10
6, 7

State v. Adams, 26 Ut. 2d 377, 489 P.2d 1191 (1971)

9

State v. Ceras, 60 Ut. 208, 207 P. 507 (1922)

5

State v. Hansen, 22 Ut. 2d 63, 448 P.2d 720 (1968)

9

State v. Hogensen, 91 U. 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936)

5

State v. Perkins, 19 Ut. 2d 421, 432 P.2d 50 (1967)

8

State v. Schultz, 27 Ut. 2d 391, 496 P.2d 893 (1972) reh.
28 Ut. 2d 240, 501 P.2d 106

7, 11

State v. Younglove, 17 Ut. 2d 268, 409 P.2d 125 (1965)

9

U.S. v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166 (3rd Cir. 1955)
U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)
U.S. v. Williams, 488 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
6, 7
9

TABLE OF CONTENTS—(Continued)
Page
STATUTES CITED
Rule 20, Utah Rules of Evidence

4

Rule 21, Utah Rules of Evidence

4

Rule 22, Utah Rules of Evidence

4

Utah Code Annotated, 1953
Section 59-37-8

10

Section 76-2-303, as supplemented 1973

7, 8

Section 78-24-1

4, 5

Section 78-24-9

4

Section 78-24-11

4

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
25 A.L.R. 3d 537

5

62 A.L.R. 2d 610

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

\
I

v.

\

PATEY CURTIS,

Case No. 13879

\
Defendant-Appellant.

J

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was a criminal action brought by the State of Utah
against Patry Curtis, Defendant-Appellant, charging him with the
crime of distribution of a controlled substance in violation of Section
58-37-8 (1) (A) (a) (ii), Utah Code Ann., 1953.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for
the County of Utah, State of Utah, on the 16th day of October, 1974,
in a non-jury trial, the Defendant was found guilty of distribution
of a controlled substance for value. On

, Defend-

ant was sentenced to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for
(

) years.
1
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Prior to trial, on the 11th day of October, 1974, in the District
Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Utah,
State of Utah, Judge Ballif heard the testimony of Eose Ann Stout
on the issue of entrapment. On the 15th day of October, 1974, in the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County
of Utah, State of Utah, Judge Bryant Croft, as trial judge, ruled
that the testimony of Eose Ann Stout given before Judge Ballif
should be stricken from the record as inadmissible and evidence taken
anew on the issue of entrapment. Judge Croft, after hearing the evidence on entrapment, ruled as a matter of law that no entrapment
occurred.

BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing the verdict and
judgment rendered at the trial of this cause and ruling as a matter
of law that entrapment occurred or in the alternative remanding the
case to the Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, for a
new trial consistent with the ruling of this Court.

S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S
Beginning sometime in March, 1974, Eose Ann Stout, working as
an undercover agent of the Eegion Four Task Force, State of Utah,
made the acquaintance of Defendant P a t r y Curtis for the purpose
of purchasing narcotics., (Hearing Transcript 33, Trial Transcript
5-6). Despite an initial conversation concerning drugs, Eose Ann
Stout testified that her first " b u y " of drugs from Defendant did
not occur until April 8, 1974. (H. 33). Defendant, against his own
interest, testified that during March and April of 1974 he was continuously procuring drugs for Stout for her personal use. (T. 66),
The Task Force had no record of these additional transactions.

2
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The transaction in question occurred on June 18, 1974 in Provo,
Utah. Stout with money supplied and recorded by the Region Four
Task Force paid Defendant for drugs, specifically amphetamines,
which Defendant had purchased for Stout from a third party. (T. 6-15,
64-65). The transaction was monitored but not fully observed by the
members of the Task Force. (T. 29-30). Defendant was immediately
arrested, the marked money was found on his person. (T. 30). Stout
one hour later turned in the amphetamines to the Task Force (T. 34).
Defendant does not deny supplying Stout with amphetamines on
June 18, 1974 and on prior occasions. However, Defendant testified
that he never did so voluntarily but only at the repeated urgings
of Stout and never at any profit to himself. (T. 56). While Stout
denied any sexual relations between herself and Defendant (H. 37),
Defendant and a defense witness testified that such a relationship
did exist in March and April of 1974. (T. 50, H. 78). Despite the
sexual relationship between Stout and Defendant terminating prior
to the transaction in question, Defendant testified that it had influenced him greatly and that he would not have procured drugs for
Stout at any time but for their previous sexual relationship (T. 61-62).
Throughout the entrapment hearing, the testimony of which was
incorporated into the trial (T. 43), and the trial itself, defense counsel attempted to introduce evidence of Stout's motives for joining
the Task Force and testifying against Curtis. Additionally, defense
counsel sought, for purposes of motive and credibility, the admission
of evidence showing the pattern and practice of Stout as an undercover agent in not turning in drugs, in using drugs herself, and in
starting others on drugs. The court either disallowed or limited this
line of questioning. (H. 6-28, T. 48-49, 88-90).

3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E TRIAL COURT E R R E D IN LIMITING T H E L I N E
OF QUESTIONING ON T H E MOTIVES, CREDIBILITY,
AND P A T T E R N AND P R A C T I C E OF ROSE ANN STOUT
IN H E R CAPACITY OF AN UNDERCOVER AGENT.
Throughout the entrapment hearing and trial itself, defense counsel in his examination of Rose Ann Stout (H. 6-28, 41-49), and the
various defense witnesses (H. 53, 59, 78, T. 48-49, 88-90) attempted
to establish the motives for Stout in joining the Task Force and in
testifying, her pattern and practice in working as an undercover
agent in regards to using drugs herself, in turning drugs procured
into the Task Force, and in starting others on drugs. The trial court,
despite Judge Ballif's ruling in the prior evidentiary hearing held
on October 11, 1974 that such evidence was admissible, either excluded the testimony entirely or severely limited the scope of the
questioning. In not permitting the defense to demonstrate the illegal personal involvement of Stout in narcotics which was made
easier by her privileged position on the Task Force, the trial court
unduly restricted the examination into her motives and credibility.
Under Sections 78-24-1, 78-24-9, and 78-24-11, Utah Code Ann.,
1953, the character and motives of a witness may be admissible as
to the witness' credibility with certain exceptions. Section 78-24-1,
supra, only allows the character of the witness for truth, honesty,
or integrity to be drawn into question. Sections 78-24-9 and 78-24-11,
supra, protect against improper, insulting, or degrading questions
to a witness with the caveat in Section 78-24-9 that a degrading question must be answered when it pertains to a fact in issue.
The statutes, as do Rules 20, 21, and 22 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, conform with the general proposition that the interest and

4
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bias of a witness can always be shown. 25 A L E 3d 537; State

v.

Ceras, 60 IT. 208, 207 P.507 (1922). Similarly, motives of a witness
are never considered immaterial and thus wide latitude should generally be given in the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses in.
criminal trials. 62 A L E 2d 610. At least one Utah case has stated
that where a conflict in testimony of opposing witnesses exist, their
reputation for truth and veracity becomes a relevant issue under
Section 78-24-1, supra. LeGrand

Johnson

Corp. v. Peterson,

18 Ut.

2d 260,420 P.2d 615 (1966).
This court in State t\ Hogensen,

91 U. 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936)

addressed the issue of whether prior specific conduct could be elicited
to affect the credibility, as opposed to the motives, of a witness.
After an extensive discussion of the circumstances when such testimony would be admissible, " . . . if it is pertinent to establish the
ultimate fact in issue or to a fact from which such a fact may be
presumed or inferred. . .," the court concluded that it was not permissible in a homicide trial to allow the defense to show the morally
bad character of an eye-witness simply for reliability purposes.

In

the case at bar, defense counsel was attempting to show specific instances where Stout received drugs but did not turn them in or
started others on drugs to attack her credibility as an honest and
truthful witness in a narcotics case.
Shortly after the decision in State v. Hogenson, supra, this court
again defined the permissible scope of questions to a witness but in
light of the statutory prohibition against degrading questions.

In

In re Sadlier, 97 Ut. 291, 85 P.2d 810 (1938), a juvenile witness had
been held in contempt for refusing to answer a question on her sexual
relations with defendant in a carnal knowledge case on the grounds
it was incriminating and degrading. It was held that since the state
was only charging one specific instance of carnal knowledge between
5
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the defendant and the juvenile witness, any prior sexual relations
between them would not be relevant. Also, the court noted that it
was the state asking the question on direct of its own witness and
stated that such a question might be proper on cross-examination.
The case law and statutes on the permissible scope of the questioning of witnesses as to credibility and motives provide only general guidelines, however, it is clear that greater latitude is allowed
in questioning an adverse witness. Here, defense counsel was not
attempting to degrade Stout or embarrass her. Rather, the entire
line of questioning on her involvement in narcotics was for the purpose of attacking her credibility and demonstrating her motives in
testifying.

Her illegal involvement with drugs went to the fact in

issue, whether Defendant Curtis was guilty of selling drugs or whether
Stout entrapped him into committing the offense.

POINT I I
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D IN NOT RULING AS A
MATTER OF LAW T H A T T H E D E F E N D A N T W A S
E N T R A P P E D INTO COMMITTING T H E O F F E N S E
CHARGED.
Consistently, from Sorrells
more recent U.S. v. Russell,

v. U.S., 287 U.S. 435 (1932) to the

411 U.S. 423 (1973), the United States

Supreme Court has sanctioned as a tool of crime detection trickery
and persuasion by government agents but only when used against
persons predisposed to commit the crime in question. As stated by
the Court in Sorrells v. U.S., supra.,
I t is well settled that decoys may be used to entrap criminals, and to present opportunity to one intending or willing
to commit crime. But decoys are not permissible to ensnare
the innocent and law-abiding into the commission of crime.
When the criminal design originates, not with the accused,
6
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but is conceived in the mind of the government officers, and
the accused is by persuasion, deceitful representation, or inducement lured into the commission of a criminal act, the government is estopped by sound public policy from prosecution
therefore. 287 U.S. 435, 445.
The emphasis on the predisposition of the accused was continued
in Sherman v. U.S., 356 U.S. 369 (1958) where the Court found that
the defendant, a drug addict, had been entrapped into selling drugs
to an agent when the evidence showed that the defendant was not
normally a dealer, made no profit from the transaction, and committed the offense only after the repeated urgings of the agent. The
so-called "subjective test" of Sorrells v. U.S., supra, and Sherman
v. U.S., supra, was affirmed in U.S. v. Russell, supra. The defendant
was charged with the manufacturing and sale of a controlled substance. An undercover agent had supplied the defendant with a chemical essential to the manufacturing of the particular drug. The Court
held that the defendant was not entrapped since he had been engaged in the illegal activity prior to any involvement by the government agent and so was obviously predisposed to commit the offense.
'Similarly, Utah case law prior to the recent enacted statute, Section 76-2-303, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as supplemented 1973, appears
to have adopted the subjective approach, focusing on the predisposition of the accused, rather than the objective approach, looking solely
at the conduct of the police. Typical of pre-1973 Utah law is State
v. Schultz, 27 Ut. 2d 391, 496 P.2d 893 (1972), reh. 28 Ut. 2d 240,
501 P.2d 106, which involved a defendant who acted as a go-between
in a narcotics sale to an undercover officer. Despite the officer initiating the transaction, this court found that no entrapment occurred.
The defendant by his own admission of generally procuring narcotics
for friends "as a favor" and testimony as to a prior sale made by
the defendant was shown to be predisposed to commit the crime
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charged. The case was remanded after rehearing for the addition
of a jury instruction on the defendant acting as an agent of the officer in procuring the drugs.
While Section 76-2-303, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as supplemented
1973, has changed some of the procedural aspects of asserting the
defense of entrapment, the statute appears to have retained on the
main a subjective approach. Subsection (1) of Section 76-2-303 reads,
. . . Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating
a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one
not otherwise ready to commit it. . . .
The statute still focuses on predisposition to determine if the accused is "one not otherwise ready to commit" the offense and then
as a second prong looks to the inducement used, the conduct of the
police.
In reaching a conclusion on predisposition, Subsection (6) of
Section 76-2-303, supra, changes Utah case law which viewed prior similar crimes committed by the defendant as admissible to show his predisposition to commit the crime charged. State v. Perkins,

19 Ut. 2d

421, 432 P.2d 50 (1967). The instant statute prohibits the admission
of past offenses of the defendant except for past felonies where
the defendant testifies. So generally, the State will be limited to the
conduct and words of the defendant at the time of the crime charged
to show predisposition.

However, where, as Defendant Curtis did

in the case at bar, the accused testifies prior felonies may be admitted. Additionally, the statute does not modify prior Utah law
which allows the State to cross examine the defendant as to his
character and reputation for participating in the activity charged
where the defendant has attempted on direct to show his good char8
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acter and reputation. State v. Adams,
(1971); State v. Younglove,

26 Ut. 2d 377, 489 P.2d 1191

17 Ut. 2d 268, 409 P.2d 125 (1965); State

v. Hansen, 22 Ut. 2d 63, 448 P.2d 720 (1968).
From the testimony at the entrapment hearing and later at trial,
the State failed to show that Defendant was normally actually involved in illegal drug traffic nor had a reputation as being involved
in such activity. This lack of predisposition was despite Defendant
taking the stand, thus opening himself to extensive cross-examination.
There was no evidence of any reputation for dealing with drugs on
the part of Defendant even though the State could have gone into
this as rebuttal evidence.
In looking at the second prong of the test for entrapment, the
inducement used or conduct of the police, Defendant testified that
but for the initial sexual relationship between himself and Stout, he
would not have procurred drugs for her at any time. Such an assertion is consistent with the lack of evidence to show that he was
predisposed to sell narcotics. The inducement used by Stout was
not that used in an ordinary buyer-seller relationship, U.S. v.

Williams,

488 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974) even if Stout's denial of an actual sexual
relationship is believed. Once such excessive inducement was used,
its effects as between this Defendant and this agent were set even
if the actual physical relationship had terminated shortly before the
transaction in question.
POINT I I I

WHEN THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT IS
MERELY ACTING AS A GO-BETWEEN IN PROCURING
DRUGS FOR AN UNDERCOVER AGENT AND NO EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT WAS PERSONALLY RECEIVING ANY GAIN FROM THE TRANSACTION, THE
DEFENDANT CANNOT BE FOUND GUILTY OF DISTRIBUTING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR
VALUE.
9
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Under most statutes prohibiting the sale of narcotics, including
the instant statute Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Ann. 1953, a crucial
factor is that the illegal distribution be for value. Thus, if no profit
or gain resulted from the transaction, the accused could not be convicted under the distribution for value statute but could be convicted
under say an illegal possession statute. The recognition that commercial sellers of illegal drugs should be punished differently and
more severely than persons who might share, give-away, or purchase
drugs for another at no personal gain gave rise to the procuring
agent rule or defense. Simply stated, the rule is
. . . one who has acted without interest in the selling cannot
be convicted as a seller even though his conduct may in fact
have facilitated an illegal sale. U.S. v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166,
169 (3rd Cir. 1955).
The rule has especially been applied in cases where the accused made
the purchase for an undercover agent-buyer and received no profit
thereby. Durham v. State, 162 Cr. 25, 280 S.W.2d 737 (Texas Cr.
1955); Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Texas Cr. 1965); Roy v. State,
87 Nev. 517, 489 P.2d 1158 (Nev. 1971), stating the rule as being
"fundamental."
As noted in Posey v. State, 507 P.2d 576 (Okla. Cr. 1973), the
procuring agent rule has been widely recognized in the federal courts
and accepted in many state courts. In Posey v. State, supra, the
Oklahoma court held that where the "go-between" defendant had
no financial interest in the sale, nor pre-arranged plan or conspiracy
with the supplier, it would be mere speculation to convict the defendant of selling narcotics. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court in Adams
v. U.S., 220 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1955) concluded that, despite the
buyer-informant testifying that the defendant told him the more buys
the defendant brought to the supplier, the greater the percentage
10
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for the defendant, all the evidence was consistent with the defendant's assertion that she was only acting as a purchasing agent. The
court held that without any evidence that the accused received a
profit or was associated with the supplier, a sales conviction would
be based on mere speculation. In People v. Fortes, 24 AD 2d 408,
260 NYS 2d 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965), the procuring agent rule was
followed despite the accused receiving a $5.00 gratuity from the buyer.
Utah adopted the procuring agent rule in State v. Shultz, 27 Ut.
2d 391, 496 P.2d 893 (1972), reh. 28 Ut, 2d 240, 501 P.2d 106. Two
police agents asked the defendant to locate a drug dealer so that
they could make a purchase. With money from the agents, defendant
purchased the drugs from an unidentified dealer. Defendant was
convicted of selling narcotics. Despite one of the police agents testifying that defendant had made a prior drug sale to him and the defendant admitting that he sometimes would help addicts procure drugs
"as a favor," this Court held that the defendant was entitled to an
instruction that if defendant acted solely for the benefit of the buyer
and at the latter's direction, defendant would not be guilty of selling
narcotics.
Defendant testified at trial, both on direct and cross examination, that he never received any profit from any drug transactions
with Stout but was merely acting as a conduit for her. (T. 55-56).
While there is some conflict in the testimony, it appears that at least
once, on April 24, 1974, the actual supplier was present during the
transaction with Stout and Defendant. (T. 58-60). This transaction
was monitored and taped by the Task Force. (T. 81-84). In the
tape, Defendant clearly states that he is merely acting as a go-between
at no personal profit. Additionally, even though Defendant took the
stand and opened himself to extensive cross examination by the State,
there was no evidence introduced to show that defendant was not
11
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acting as the claimed "go-between." Under such a fact situation,
the procuring agent rule should apply precluding a conviction under
the distribution for value statute.

CONCLUSION
The trial court unduly limited the scope of the defense questioning of Rose Ann Stout as to her motives and credibility in testifying
against Defendant. Evidence of Stout's illegal involvement in narcotics during the time she served as an undercover agent was also
improperly restricted as it directly related to her reliability as a
witness in a narcotics sale where entrapment was an issue. The conviction should therefore be reversed and the case remanded for a
new trial.
In light of the evidence which was introduced during the entrapment hearing and at trial, the trial court erred in not ruling as a
matter of law that entrapment occurred. Additionally, under the
procuring agent rule, the trial court should have directed a verdict
of acquittal. On both these grounds, the conviction should be reversed
and the case dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,

Robert Van Sciver
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
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